On October 5, 2026, hundreds of battery-powered rickshaw pullers gathered outside Dhaka’s National Press Club, protesting police harassment, vehicle seizures, and restrictions on their livelihoods. The blockade brought traffic to a standstill, adding to commuters’ frustration with recurring disruptions, road safety concerns, and the growing presence of unregulated vehicles. It was another episode in Dhaka’s increasingly uneasy relationship with its rickshaws. Yet just three years earlier, UNESCO had recognized Dhaka’s rickshaws and rickshaw painting as part of humanity’s intangible cultural heritage, celebrating generations of craftsmanship and everyday urban culture.
There is something distinctly Bangladeshi about this contradiction. The rickshaw is both a national cultural emblem and a contested participant in the country’s urban economy. Its painted surfaces symbolize collective identity, while its operators continually negotiate their place on the streets. The tension reflects a larger struggle over class, mobility, and who gets to occupy the modern city.
This struggle has a longer history across Asia. Originating from nineteenth-century Japan’s jinrikisha, human-powered passenger vehicles spread through colonial trade networks and developed regional identities. In Kolkata for example, hand-pulled rickshaws became entangled in debates over human dignity, poverty, and modernization, as political leaders sought their removal while operators defended their livelihoods. Across Southeast Asia, cycle rickshaws connected dense residential and commercial neighborhoods, providing affordable mobility through human labor. The arrangement carried an inherent social hierarchy. Passengers purchased convenience through someone else’s physical effort, while cities gained flexible transportation with modest infrastructure requirements. For many newly independent cities, it was among the most affordable means of urban mobility. As motorization expanded, planners prioritized traffic speed and road capacity, and automobile ownership became associated with economic advancement. The resulting classification of vehicles reflected a wider hierarchy of urban society.
Dhaka inherited these tensions but developed an unusually intimate relationship with the rickshaw. Historical accounts place its arrival around the late 1930s. Authorities were discussing its replacement by 1944, and licensing restrictions followed during the 1950s. Yet the vehicle flourished as Dhaka expanded through the Pakistan period and emerged as the capital of independent Bangladesh. While planning in cities such as Karachi or Islamabad increasingly accommodated motorized movement and longer journeys, Dhaka’s dense neighborhoods and short-distance travel patterns provided fertile ground for cycle rickshaws. Dhaka’s growing middle class embraced their convenience, making rickshaws part of the city’s social geography.
Around the same period, Western urbanists were challenging automobile-dominated planning in search of safer, more human-centered streets. In New York, Jane Jacobs championed the idea of “eyes on the street,” while Fred Kent, drawing on William H. Whyte’s research, advanced principles of public life that later became central to the concept of “placemaking”. In Copenhagen, Jan Gehl advocated designing cities around human interaction and pedestrian experience. Dhaka, meanwhile, had developed a vernacular form of mobility that embodied several of these ideas. Occupying a space between walking and motorized transport, the pedal rickshaw moved at a human pace, maintained visual connections with the street, and offered shelter from monsoon rain. With virtually no direct operating emissions, it connected homes, markets, and workplaces while sustaining a local economy. Several qualities that Western urbanists were advocating through research and planning had become ordinary features of Dhaka’s street life.
This relationship with the streets also gave the rickshaw an unusual cultural authority. Its painted surfaces expressed the tastes and aspirations of ordinary Bangladeshis through elements like flowers, birds, rivers, and village scenes. Each of these elements carried memories of rural Bengal into a rapidly urbanizing metropolis. Their exuberant maximalism contrasted with the architectural restraint embraced by sections of the urban elite. In the decades that followed, the vivid aesthetics of Bangla cinema, with its stars, advertisements, and celluloid fantasies, found a natural place on these vibrant moving canvases. Political commentary, social anxieties, and global events entered the imagery, making rickshaw painting a visible expression of popular sentiment across the streetscape.
In recent decades, galleries, fashion designers, and affluent cultural circles have embraced this aesthetic, granting institutional prestige to a visual culture sustained for generations by ordinary Bangladeshis. UNESCO’s recognition in 2023 affirmed its craftsmanship and artistic significance, although the celebration of its visual appeal risks overlooking the social imagination that produced it. Long before rickshaw art became fashionable, its imagery had expressed the memories, pleasures, anxieties, and aspirations of people whose influence over the city’s formal architecture and planning remained limited.
With new access and recognition, one might reasonably assume that the rickshaw itself would command the same respect as its celebrated artwork, especially since UNESCO recognized both within a shared cultural tradition. Yet rickshaw’s place in Dhaka remains politically contested. The middle class that once embraced its convenience now associates it more readily with congestion, disorder, and the frustrations of daily commuting. For thousands of pullers, meanwhile, the vehicle remains a means of financial survival. It is still the first mode of employment for rural to urban migrants, something a commuter cannot avoid moving through the city and the most unpopular catalyst in urban policymaking. How did something so closely associated with Bangladesh’s cultural identity become a point of friction between passengers’ economic aspirations, operators’ livelihoods, and the authorities deciding who belongs on Dhaka’s streets?
Part of the answer lies in the changing fortunes of the middle class. Since the 1990s, economic growth has raised expectations of better housing, private transportation, and financial security. Those aspirations have become harder to sustain amid recent economic pressures. A 2026 study by the Power and Participation Research Centre identified nearly 18 percent of Bangladeshi households as a financially fragile middle, representing approximately 31 million people vulnerable to downward mobility. Rising living costs and pressure on household incomes have made familiar conveniences more expensive.
These anxieties reach the street through everyday encounters. A passenger negotiating a fare and a puller calculating the day’s earnings experience different sides of the same financial pressure. On social media, complaints about excessive fares, reckless driving, and recurring blockades can portray commuters as hostages to rickshaw operators. Popular assumptions about unexpectedly wealthy pullers add to the resentment. Yet a Bangladesh Institute of Labour Studies survey found that 96 percent of the 200 Dhaka pullers surveyed rented their vehicles. Daily collections conceal rental obligations and the uncertainties of informal employment. The conflict between passengers and pullers increasingly resembles a confrontation between economically pressured groups whose frustrations meet over the price of a journey.
Over time, Dhaka’s economic divisions have become entangled with political influence and administrative control, creating smaller cities within the metropolis. Gulshan, Banani, Baridhara, Bashundhara, and Niketan have developed varying degrees of controlled access, while the Cantonment operates under separate military jurisdiction. These enclaves sit beside lower-income neighborhoods whose residents provide much of their everyday labor and services, yet movement between them follows different rules. Rickshaws expose the consequences of this fragmentation. Following security incidents in 2015 and 2016, residential associations in the diplomatic zone introduced designated rickshaws with fixed fares, identification cards, and restricted routes. Anthropologist Annemiek Prins documented a reduction in the permitted fleet from an estimated 10,000 to 1,230 vehicles. In Niketan, sociologist Lutfun Nahar Lata documented restrictions affecting residents of the adjacent low-income Sattola settlement. These arrangements show how residential privilege can extend into control over mobility. A passenger and an available puller may be separated by only a few streets, yet administrative boundaries can turn a short journey into a longer, costlier one. In a metropolis dependent on movement between rich and poor neighborhoods, restrictions of this kind deepen the divisions that shared infrastructure is supposed to bridge.
The consequences extend to public safety, where women’s experiences expose another inequality. A 2018 BRAC study found that 94 percent of 357 women surveyed had experienced sexual harassment on roads or during travel. Against overcrowded buses and unsafe waiting environments, rickshaws offered relatively private seating, direct access, and visibility from surrounding streets. Research by Maruf Hossain and Yusak Susilo also identified women and lower- and middle-income residents as vulnerable to restrictions on rickshaw mobility. For many women, choosing a rickshaw meant paying more for a greater sense of security, turning safety into another expense shaped by class. That advantage has become less certain with the spread of battery-powered vehicles, whose higher speeds, inadequate braking systems, and inconsistent driver training have introduced new risks.
These safety concerns intersect with Bangladesh’s recent political upheavals. In 2018, students protesting the deaths of two schoolchildren occupied intersections, checked licenses, and imposed traffic discipline, exposing failures in road safety enforcement. Following Sheikh Hasina’s fall on August 5, 2024, students again found themselves managing traffic as police withdrew. The sudden absence of enforcement allowed longstanding restrictions on rickshaws to weaken almost overnight. Pedal and battery-powered vehicles flooded major thoroughfares, marking an unspoken shift in street power. Traffic order gradually returned, but electric rickshaws had secured a lasting foothold, placing growing pressure on traditional pedal operators. New motorized variations spread across Dhaka with inconsistent safety standards. BUET researchers identified at least ten or eleven electric three-wheeler designs with varying construction and safety features, while a January 2026 study found that 97.4 percent of battery-powered rickshaws in its sample operated without registration. The political vacuum had closed, but Dhaka inherited a transport landscape in which commercial adoption and technological change had outpaced regulation.
Battery-powered rickshaws had been spreading across Dhaka’s peripheral areas for years, but the political transition accelerated their arrival on previously restricted roads. In the Gulshan-Banani-Badda area alone, a local drivers’ association estimated that their number rose from 3,000 before August 2024 to 8,000 by October 2025. Electric assistance offered operators higher earning potential with less physical exhaustion, while intensifying competition with traditional pedal pullers. The consequences surfaced in April 2025, when attempts to restrict electric rickshaws in Gulshan and Banani triggered clashes involving drivers, residents, and motorcyclists. Reports of assaults, intimidation, and vehicles being thrown into Gulshan Lake fueled public resentment. For financially vulnerable operators, access to profitable routes had become worth fighting for, even as the confrontations further strained relations with the wider public.
During the 2025 pre-election period, even the image of the rickshaw puller became a political instrument. Dismislab identified AI-generated campaign videos featuring fictional pullers endorsing political parties, borrowing the perceived authenticity of working-class voices to manufacture political support. The use of these synthetic figures illustrates how the identity of a visible, economically vulnerable occupation can be appropriated for political messaging. It also blurs the public’s ability to distinguish genuine political participation from manufactured expressions of popular allegiance.
Electrification has connected the puller’s financial survival to Bangladesh’s strained energy economy. In September 2026, Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed told parliament that an estimated five to eight million battery-powered three-wheelers and similar vehicles consumed around five percent of the country’s daily electricity. These official estimates require independent verification, but they point to another economic tension. Electric motors reduce physical exhaustion and may increase daily earnings, while shifting operating costs toward batteries, charging infrastructure, and an electricity system already facing financial and supply pressures. The October protests over charging restrictions and vehicle seizures brought these competing demands into the same confrontation.
Taken together, these developments reveal how Dhaka’s affection for the rickshaw is being worn down by its everyday experience. Generations have romanticized monsoon rain beneath its canopy, first loves unfolding along familiar streets, evening journeys for street food, and the festivities of Eid and Pohela Boishakh. Yet many of those memories also carry the irritation of a puller refusing a destination, demanding an unreasonable fare, or turning a pleasant journey into an argument. For decades, these encounters were familiar inconveniences within a larger cultural affection. Today, financial pressures and repeated confrontations have given them a sharper social meaning. Online, accounts of fare disputes, reckless driving, and road blockades compete with nostalgia, making the puller a familiar target for Dhaka’s frustrations.
Electrification has added another dimension to this shift. The rhythm of the pedal rickshaw is giving way in many places to faster, poorly regulated vehicles whose appearance and behavior alter the experience people once cherished. The puller’s worsening public image and the vehicle’s changing character begin to reinforce each other. The same mobility that once connected neighborhoods across social boundaries now exposes divisions in purchasing power, political influence, and access to the city.
Perhaps the deeper concern is what this growing frustration says about Dhaka itself. Rickshaw pullers need to earn a living, and passengers deserve fair fares, safer roads, and journeys free from unnecessary disruption. Both expectations carry responsibilities, especially in a city where individual decisions can affect thousands of fellow road users. As Bangladesh continues to celebrate the rickshaw as part of its national identity, one question remains: Are we falling out of love with the rickshaw, or is our changing relationship with it revealing how far our expectations of city life have shifted?