After the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh on 5 August in the face of intense mass protests by students and the people, the Indian media created one sided narrative. The Bangladesh-India relationship centred on the minority issue had a negative impact on the people of both countries.
The Awami League is an “old ally” in Dhaka as it is “favourable” to India. However, India has faced questions over its years of support for the “unpopular” Awami League government due to controversial elections, human rights violations, extrajudicial killings, brutal use of force against the opposition, suppression of freedom of speech, and disappearances by security forces. “
Ultimately, after Hasina’s fall, there is a crisis of trust between the two countries. Meanwhile, China and Pakistan are desperate to take advantage of this.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has lost to Pakistan and China on the Bangladesh issue, said Professor Ashok Swain, head of the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University in Sweden, on social media.
He spoke candidly about exactly where Bangladesh-India relations hit rock bottom. Abdul Majid Chowdhury interviewed this keen observer of Bangladesh affairs.
1. How do you interpret Tulsi Gabbard’s remark about Bangladesh being an “Islamic Caliphate”? Since it was made during a TV interview and not an official statement, should Bangladesh be concerned about the implications of this comment? Additionally, the US State Department has avoided directly commenting on the security of minorities in Bangladesh. Does this add any significance to the situation?
Tulsi Gabbard’s comment labeling Bangladesh as an “Islamic Caliphate” appears to align with the rhetoric of India’s Hindutva-influenced media and right-wing groups, rather than reflecting an objective assessment of the situation. Her association with the Hare Krishna cult and close ties with India’s ruling party BJP suggest that her remarks may be politically motivated rather than based on US intelligence assessments.
Despite being made in a TV interview rather than an official statement, such comments can still have diplomatic consequences. Gabbard holds a key intelligence position in the Trump administration, and her remarks could influence perceptions in Washington, particularly among conservative policymakers. Bangladesh has valid reasons to be concerned, as such statements might affect foreign investments, diplomatic engagements, and security cooperation.
The US State Department’s avoidance of direct comments on the security of minorities in Bangladesh adds a layer of uncertainty. It suggests that the US administration is trying to maintain diplomatic flexibility and avoid taking a firm stance while monitoring the evolving political landscape. This ambiguity leaves room for different interpretations—particularly, a strategic move to avoid antagonising Bangladesh.
2. Prof Yunus recently stated, “We’re global players, not for smaller grounds.” Despite the Democratic Party not being in power in the US, they have been vocal in supporting free and fair elections in Bangladesh during Hasina’s regime. Under a potential Trump 2.0 administration, what do you think Yunus can do to navigate these challenges to enhance his global image?
Prof Yunus has cultivated an international reputation beyond Bangladesh’s domestic politics, particularly in areas related to economic development, microfinance, and social entrepreneurship. A Nobel Prize in Peace also adds to his aura. With the return of the Trump administration, he may focus on reinforcing his image as a global leader rather than a local political figure.
To navigate these challenges, Yunus can engage with international institutions, including the UN, EU, and global financial organisations, to advocate for democratic stability in Bangladesh. His recent visit with the UN Secretary General to Cox Bazar relief camps for Rohingya refugees is also part of that strategy. He may also leverage support from US civil society, business leaders, and influential figures within the Democratic Party, which he is doing to maintain his relevance and importance. Additionally, he could focus on economic and development partnerships that align with US interests, particularly in the Indo-Pacific strategy, to ensure Bangladesh remains strategically significant under a Trump administration.
3. Prof Yunus is set to visit China, a move that raises concerns in India due to China’s growing influence in Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina also visited China in July, just before the uprising, but various reports suggest that the visit did not have a significant impact. Now, less than a year later, Yunus is making his own trip to China. Do you think this visit signals a new shift or polarisation in the China-Bangladesh relationship?
Yunus’s visit to China could indicate a further deepening of Bangladesh-China relations, especially given the recent deterioration of Bangladesh-India ties. While Hasina’s visit did not lead to immediate changes, the evolving political situation may prompt China to take a more active role in supporting Bangladesh’s interim government.
This visit may also signal a broader shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy strategy, potentially moving away from an overreliance on India. While not necessarily a direct polarisation, strengthening ties with China could serve as a counterbalance to India’s influence. Bangladesh’s increasing engagement with China also aligns with regional trends where smaller South Asian nations, including Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and even Bhutan, are seeking diversified partnerships to reduce dependency on India.
4. UN Secretary-General António Guterres recently visited Bangladesh, bringing attention to the worsening Rohingya issue, which had not been a major focus for some time. Do you foresee any significant developments regarding the repatriation of Rohingya refugees during Yunus’s visit to China?
Prof Yunus’s visit to China provides a strategic opportunity to engage Beijing in discussions regarding the Rohingya crisis. Given China’s influence over Myanmar’s military government, Beijing remains a key player in any potential repatriation efforts.
However, past Chinese-led initiatives on Rohingya repatriation have largely stalled due to Myanmar’s reluctance and ongoing conflicts within the country. The internal security situation has also become precarious. While Yunus’s visit may help restart dialogue, significant breakthroughs will likely require broader international coordination, including involvement from ASEAN, the UN, and the US, and a stable, democratic Myanmar.
5. You recently mentioned on Twitter that PM Narendra Modi “Lost to China and Pakistan on Bangladesh.” India has supported Sheikh Hasina’s controversial elections since 2014, even under Congress rule. Why place the blame solely on Modi? Can you explain this statement in more detail?
While India’s support for Sheikh Hasina predates Modi’s tenure, his administration’s strategic overcommitment to the Awami League has contributed to the deterioration of India-Bangladesh relations. Unlike previous Indian governments, Modi’s approach was more closely aligned with the Hindutva ideology, which alienated many in Bangladesh.
By backing Hasina unconditionally, India lost credibility among Bangladeshi opposition groups and civil society, allowing China and Pakistan to expand their influence.
By backing Hasina unconditionally, India lost credibility among Bangladeshi opposition groups and civil society, allowing China and Pakistan to expand their influence. After the January 2024 farce election in Bangladesh, India should have taken a firm position in support of democracy. The post-August 2024 developments, including Hasina’s departure to Delhi and the worsening bilateral relations, highlight the failure of Modi’s Bangladesh policy in maintaining long-term strategic leverage.
6. Given the ongoing instability in the Middle East, why is a meeting of European intelligence chiefs taking place in India during Gabbard’s visit? Do you see any indications of political polarisation in South Asia in this context?
The meeting of Western intelligence chiefs in India during Gabbard’s visit suggests a broader realignment of intelligence-sharing frameworks, possibly in response to shifting geopolitical challenges. While South Asia is not the immediate focal point of Middle Eastern conflicts, instability in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh has regional and global implications.
This meeting may indicate increasing cooperation between India and Western intelligence agencies, potentially as a counterbalance to China’s expanding influence in South Asia. However, it does not necessarily signal a direct polarisation, as the engagement could be more focused on counterterrorism, regional security, and intelligence-sharing rather than taking explicit political sides in Bangladesh’s current crisis.
7. The Awami League leaders and activists were awaiting Tulsi Gabbard’s visit to India, hoping that her comments might put pressure on the current interim government. Do you believe that through this visit, the party has been able to achieve any of its expected objectives?
The Awami League likely hoped that Tulsi Gabbard’s visit would bring greater international attention to their narrative and create pressure on the interim government. However, while Gabbard’s remarks were provocative, they did not translate into direct US policy actions against Bangladesh’s interim government.
The broader US administration, including the State Department, has continued diplomatic engagement with Bangladesh, signaling that Gabbard’s views are not necessarily the official stance of Washington. Furthermore, India’s government has not made any major statements aligning with Gabbard’s remarks, indicating that the visit may not have significantly advanced the Awami League’s political objectives.
The broader US administration, including the State Department, has continued diplomatic engagement with Bangladesh, signaling that Gabbard’s views are not necessarily the official stance of Washington. Furthermore, India’s government has not made any major statements aligning with Gabbard’s remarks, indicating that the visit may not have significantly advanced the Awami League’s political objectives.
8. Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year rule has been marked by accusations of extrajudicial killings, abductions, and human rights violations. A UN report cited shootings ordered by Hasina to retain power. Given the global awareness of such actions, does the Indian government feel no moral responsibility for supporting Hasina? Why has it failed to consider alternatives to the Awami League, especially as India is the world’s largest democracy?
India’s support for Sheikh Hasina has been largely driven by strategic and security considerations rather than moral concerns. While human rights violations under Hasina’s rule have been widely documented, New Delhi prioritised stability, counterterrorism cooperation, and economic ties over democratic principles.
India’s failure to consider alternatives to the Awami League stems from a combination of factors: India’s Hindutva regime saw Hasina as a reliable partner in controlling Islamist extremism and ensuring cross-border security; Hasina’s government facilitated Indian trade and transit access through Bangladesh, reinforcing India’s economic leverage in the region; and India aimed to counterbalance China’s growing influence in Bangladesh by maintaining close ties with Hasina.
India’s failure to consider alternatives to the Awami League stems from a combination of factors: India’s Hindutva regime saw Hasina as a reliable partner in controlling Islamist extremism and ensuring cross-border security; Hasina’s government facilitated Indian trade and transit access through Bangladesh, reinforcing India’s economic leverage in the region; and India aimed to counterbalance China’s growing influence in Bangladesh by maintaining close ties with Hasina.
However, this long-term reliance on Hasina has backfired, leading to resentment among Bangladeshis who view India as complicit in supporting an undemocratic, repressive regime. With the interim government now engaging with China and Pakistan, India may need to rethink its approach.
9. India has often dismissed Bangladesh’s democratic issues as internal matters. However, after 5 August, India raised concerns about minority issues in Bangladesh. Has India’s past policy been flawed, and has it contributed to resentment among the Bangladeshi people?
India’s past policy of non-interference in Bangladesh’s internal democratic issues, while simultaneously backing Sheikh Hasina, has indeed been flawed. By dismissing democratic concerns and aligning too closely with Hasina, India alienated a significant portion of the Bangladeshi population, including opposition groups and civil society activists.
The recent shift in India’s rhetoric regarding minority rights in Bangladesh appears to be a reactive measure following the fall of Hasina’s government. However, this change may be seen as opportunistic rather than principled, as India remained silent for years while minorities were reportedly targeted under Hasina’s rule.
This inconsistency has fueled resentment among Bangladeshis, who perceive India’s foreign policy as selective and self-serving rather than committed to genuine democratic values and neighborly friendship.
10. The relationship between India and Bangladesh is critical for regional harmony. However, since August, India has suspended visas for Bangladeshi tourists. Does India view Bangladesh’s political situation as solely defined by the Awami League in power? Can this be considered a reflection of democratic values? Despite ideological differences, India has met with the Afghan Taliban and expressed a desire for improved relations. Why this approach with Bangladesh?
India’s visa suspension for Bangladeshi tourists suggests that New Delhi still perceives Bangladesh’s political landscape through the lens of the Awami League’s rule. This policy indirectly punishes ordinary Bangladeshis rather than engaging constructively with the new political reality.
India’s diplomatic outreach to the Afghan Taliban while simultaneously restricting engagement with Bangladesh’s interim government reflects a contradiction in its foreign policy. While India sees strategic necessity in supporting the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan due to regional security concerns vis-à-vis Pakistan, its approach to Bangladesh appears driven by political frustration over Hasina’s removal.
India’s diplomatic outreach to the Afghan Taliban while simultaneously restricting engagement with Bangladesh’s interim government reflects a contradiction in its foreign policy. While India sees strategic necessity in supporting the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan due to regional security concerns vis-à-vis Pakistan, its approach to Bangladesh appears driven by political frustration over Hasina’s removal.
This approach does not align with democratic values and neighborly spirit, as a more balanced policy would involve engaging with the current leadership of Bangladesh rather than maintaining an exclusive preference for the Awami League.
11. Many central leaders of the Awami League, along with numerous grassroots leaders and activists, have fled to India. They are now looking to the Indian government for support. Given India’s internal issues, do you think their prolonged stay in India is creating political pressure on the Indian government?
Yes, the presence of Awami League leaders and activists in India could create political and diplomatic challenges for the Indian government. While India has historically provided refuge to political figures from neighboring countries, the sheer number of fleeing Awami League members may become a domestic burden.
Several factors contribute to this pressure: Some Awami League figures are controversial due to their involvement in past political violence. Their presence in India could lead to diplomatic disputes or security concerns; if India openly supports these exiled leaders, it risks further straining relations with Bangladesh’s interim government, which is already seeking closer ties with China; and hosting former leaders accused of corruption and human rights abuses could damage India’s credibility, both domestically and internationally.
India will likely need to carefully balance its handling of these exiled figures to avoid escalating tensions with Bangladesh while managing its internal political landscape.
12. The law and order situation under the interim government remains concerning. Mob justice incidents continue, and the police have not yet become fully active. Public safety, particularly for women, is a growing crisis. Meanwhile, political parties disagree on reforms and national elections. Do you think Bangladesh can hold national elections in December this year or even in June next year?
Given the current security situation, lack of police enforcement, and political disagreements over electoral reforms, holding national elections in December 2025 or even June 2026 remains uncertain.
Key challenges include rising cases of mob justice and inadequate policing undermining public confidence in the government’s ability to ensure a free and fair election; major political parties remaining divided on election reforms, making it difficult to establish a legitimate electoral framework; and worsening conditions for women and vulnerable communities further complicating election logistics and voter participation.
For elections to be feasible, Bangladesh’s interim government must focus on stabilising law enforcement, engaging in dialogue with opposition parties, and ensuring a neutral election administration as soon as possible. If these issues are not addressed promptly, elections could be delayed further, and that will not be good for Bangladesh and its future.
For elections to be feasible, Bangladesh’s interim government must focus on stabilising law enforcement, engaging in dialogue with opposition parties, and ensuring a neutral election administration as soon as possible. If these issues are not addressed promptly, elections could be delayed further, and that will not be good for Bangladesh and its future.
Ashok Swain is a professor & head of Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden
Abdul Majid Chowdhury is a journalist, currently serving as a Sub Editor at Daily Jugantor on Its International Desk.
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